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Notes
Corporate Pension Plans as Property of the
Bankruptcy Estate
The status of a debtor's interest in bankruptcy in an em-
ployer-created Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ER-
ISA)1 plan is uncertain. The debtor views this interest not as a
present asset but as a substitute source of income for retire-
ment. To the debtor's creditors, however, the debtor's interest
in an ERISA plan represents a significant asset that should be
liquidated to satisfy their claims. The United States Courts of
Appeals for the Eighth2 and the Eleventh3 Circuits recently
have sided with the creditors, holding that a debtor's interest in
an employer-created ERISA plan must be included in the
debtor's bankruptcy estate.
The statutes applicable to the debtor's interest are ambigu-
ous. Although the Bankruptcy Code (Code) requires that all
legal or equitable property interests of the debtor be trans-
ferred to the bankruptcy estate,4 section 541(c)(2) of the Code
excludes from the estate interests in trusts that are subject to
restrictions on alienation or assignment enforceable under "ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law."5 ERISA requires that qualified
plans contain just such restrictions on alienation and assign-
ment.6 Despite these restrictions, however, most courts have
held that the "applicable nonbankruptcy law" exclusion of sec-
tion 541(c)(2) applies only to state law spendthrift trusts and
not to ERISA plans generally.7 A few courts, however, have in-
L 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
2. In re Graham, 24 Bankr. 305 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), qffd, 726 F.2d
1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
3. In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (nth Cir. 1985).
4. U U.S.C. § 542(a) (1982) requires an entity, other than a custodian,
who is in possession of the debtor's property to "deliver to the trustee, and ac-
count for, such property or the value of such property."
5. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982). "A restriction on the transfer of the bene-
ficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable . . . under this title." Id.
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1982).
7. See, ag., Lichstrah4 750 F.2d at 1490; Gmraam, 726 F.2d at 1273; In re
Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 1983).
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terpreted this phrase more broadly to exclude from the bank-
ruptcy estate ERISA plans that fail to satisfy state spendthrift
trust requirements.8
If a court determines that the debtor's interest in the ER-
ISA plan is excluded from the bankruptcy estate, the debtor's
interest automatically is protected from the claims of creditors.0
If, however, the court rules that the debtor's interest is in-
cluded in the estate, it must then determine whether the
debtor's interest may be exempted under Code section 522.10
Debtors who elect the federal exemptions may exempt an in-
8. See, e.g., In re Phillips, 34 Bankr. 543, 545 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983)
(concluding that "the language of [s]ection 541(c)(2) is clear on its face and
does not limit itself to spendthrift trusts"); In re Holt, 32 Bankr. 767, 772
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (restrictions on transfer required by ERISA are en-
forceable under federal nonbankruptcy law; debtor's interest in an employer-
created ERISA plan therefore was properly excluded from the bankruptcy es-
tate under § 541(c)(2)); In re Pruitt, 30 Bankr. 330, 331 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983)
(anti-assignment provisions required by ERISA are sufficient to exclude
debtor's interest from bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2), notwithstanding
debtor-employee's present right to withdraw funds); see also In re Rogers, 24
Bankr. 181, 183 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982) (courts need not look to state law of
spendthrift trusts to determine whether debtor's interest in medical clinic's
profit-sharing plan is excludible from the bankruptcy estate).
9. See In re Phillips, 34 Bankr. 543, 546 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, sec. 306,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 353 (1984)(effective for cases filed after Oct. 7,
1984). Section 522(b) provides:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may
exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either para-
graph (1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this subsection....
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section,
unless the state law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph
(2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize; or, in the
alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than
subsection (d) of this section, or state or local law that is applicable on
the date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's
domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the
date of the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-
day period than in any other place; and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately
before the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the
entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by
the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.
Section 522 departs significantly from prior bankruptcy law. Under the
old Bankruptcy Act, a debtor's exemptions varied drastically because the avail-
ability of these exemptions was dependent entirely on state law. See Joslin,
Debtors' Exemption Law: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355 (1959). In
an effort to reduce this disparity, the Code provides a "laundry list" of federal
exemptions, see 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), and allows the debtor to choose either fed-
eral or state exemptions, unless the debtor's state has "opted out" of either ex-
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terest in a pension plan "to the extent reasonably necessary for
the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.""
emption system. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b); see In re McManus, 681 F.2d 353, 354-56
(5th Cir. 1982).
Most states have taken advantage of the § 522(b) provisions allowing them
to "opt out" of the federal system and require their residents to rely on state
exemption systems. For a listing of those states that have elected this course
for their residents, see 3 W. COLLIER, COLLER ON BANamurc= 522.02 (15th
ed. 1984). California's opt-out statute, CAL CODE CiV. PaOC. § 703.130 (Deer-
ing 1982), recently was held unconstitutional in In e Garrido, 43 Bankr. 289
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1984). The court found that the California statute, which
permitted debtors in certain situtations to elect the federal exemptions of
§ 522(d) as a matter of state law, was unconstitutional under the supremacy
clause. Id- at 543.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) sets up a system of minimum exemptions for those
electing the federal system:
(1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value, in
real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor uses as a residence, in a cooperative that owns property
that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, or in
a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
'(2) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $1,200 in value, in one motor
vehicle.
(3) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any particular
item, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, ap-
pliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instruments, that are held
primarily for the personal, family or household use of the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor.
(4) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $500 in value, in
jewelry held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(5) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $400 plus
any unused amount of the exemption provided under paragraph (1) of
this subsection, in any property.
(6) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $750 in value, in
any implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor
or the trade of a dependent of the debtor.
(7) Any unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor,
other than a credit life insurance contract.
(8) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $4,000 less
any amount of property of the estate transferred in the manner speci-
fied in section 542(d) of this title, in any accrued dividend or interest
under, or loan value of, any unmatured life insurance contract owned
by the debtor under which the insured is the debtor or an individual
of whom the debtor is a dependent
(9) Professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a depen-
dent of the debtor.
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(A) a social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a
local public assistance benefit;
(B) a veteran's benefit;
(C) a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit;
(D) alimony, support, or separate maintenance, to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any de-
pendent of the debtor,
1985] 1115
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Debtors opting for state law exemption systems, on the other
hand, may exempt ERISA plan interests only if state law so al-
lows, or if the court determines that a debtor's interest falls
within the "other federal law" exemption of Code section
522(b)(2)(A). 12 Again, the courts have divided, with the major-
ity concluding that ERISA is not "other federal law" as con-
templated by section 522 and that the debtor's interest in such a
plan therefore is not exempted.' 3
This Note examines the treatment of an employee-debtor's
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, an-
nuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disabil-
ity, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor, unless-
(i) such plan or contract was established by or
under the auspices of an insider that employed the
debtor at the time the debtor's rights under such
plan or contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of
service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under
section 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. § 401(a),
403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409).
(11) The debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to-
(A) an award under a crime victim's reparation law;
(B) a payment on account of the wrongful death of an individ-
ual of whom the debtor was a dependent, to the extent reason-
ably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent
of the debtor,
(C) a payment under a life insurance contract that insured the
life of an individual of whom the debtor was a dependent on the
date of such individual's death, to the extent reasonably neces-
sary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor,
(D) a payment, not to exceed $7,500, on account of personal
bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation
for actual pecuniary loss, of the debtor or an individual of whom
the debtor is a dependent; or
(E) a payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of the
debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is or was a depen-
dent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and any dependent of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(emphasis added).
12. Section 522(b)(2)(A) allows debtors electing the state exemption sys-
tem to exempt "any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than
subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law." Subsection (d) is the
"laundry list" of federal exemptions, set out supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d at 1490-91 (debtor's interest in ERISA
plan not exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A)); Graham, 726 F.2d at 1274 (same); Goff,
706 F.2d at 582-86 (same). But see In re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233, 235 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1982) (debtor's interest in ERISA plan exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A)).
See infra notes 93-110 and accompanying text.
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interest in an employer-created ERISA plan under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Part I sets out the operative provisions of ERISA.
Part H analyzes the "applicable nonbankruptcy law' exclusion
of section 541(c)(2). Part HI then discusses the exemption pro-
visions of the Code and their effect on ERISA plans. Finally,
Part IV considers possible exceptions to the proposed general
rule necessary to prevent the use of ERISA plans to defraud
creditors. This Note concludes that in the absence of actual
fraud, a debtor's interest in a qualified ERISA plan should be
excluded from the bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2).
I. ERISA
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to provide additional se-
curity to employees participating in private pension plans.14
ERISA establishes a uniform law1 5 giving employees certain
protections with respect to the vesting and funding of em-
ployer-created employee retirement plans. 16 Under ERISA,
contributions to qualified plans are placed in a trust, and em-
ployees cannot reach fund contributions until retirement.17
Both employers and employees receive beneficial tax treatment
for qualified ERISA plan contributions. A trust created pursu-
ant to ERISA is exempt from taxation if under the terms of the
trust instrument the funds cannot be used or diverted for any
purpose other than for the exclusive benefit of employees or
their beneficiaries.18 Thus, under a qualified plan, employee
contributions are exempt from taxation when made,'9 and in-
come is recognized only when proceeds are distributed in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the plan.20 Moreover, because
14. See S. REP. No. 127, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 US.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4838.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982) preempts state law applicable to pension
plans qualified under ERISA. ERISA provisions "supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan" within the coverage of ERISA. Id.; see Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d
70, 77 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
16. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1982) (establishing minimum vesting and
participation standards); 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1982) (establishing minimum fund-
ing standards for qualified plans).
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1982).
18. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(2) (1982). To be qualified, a trust must provide that
benefits may not be assigned or alienated. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13). Despite
this general prohibition, a participant currently receiving benefits may make
voluntary assignments of up to 10% of any benefit payment. Id.
19. 26 U.S.C. § 3401(a)(12)(A) (1982).
20. 26 U.S.C. § 402(a)(1) (1982).
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ERISA plan contributions are tax deductible by the employer,2 '
the employer may provide essentially the same retirement ben-
efits to employees under an ERISA-qualified plan at a substan-
tially lower cost than it could under a nonqualified plan. If the
plan fails to qualify, however, employers may not deduct plan
contributions, and employees must recognize income at the
time of their employer's contribution.22
To qualify for tax deferral, an ERISA plan must meet sev-
eral requirements. Perhaps the most significant limitation is
that benefits under the plan cannot be assignable or alienable.23
Specifically, the Treasury Regulations provide that "a trust will
not be qualified [for tax exempt status] unless the plan of
which the trust is a part provides that benefits provided under
the plan may not be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in
equity), alienated or subject to attachment, garnishment, levy,
execution or other legal or equitable process. '2 4 The regula-
tions define assignment or alienation to include a transfer of
the debtor's interest to the bankruptcy trustee.25 Thus, a trans-
fer of a debtor's interest in an ERISA plan to the bankruptcy
estate would disqualify the plan.
II. EXCLUSION UNDER SECTION 541(c)(2)
A debtor's ERISA plan interest avoids a disqualifying
transfer only if the debtor's interest in the plan is excluded
from the bankruptcy estate.2 6 The 1978 Bankruptcy Code2 7
changed the concept of the property of the bankruptcy estate.
Under the old Bankruptcy Act,28 only nonexempt property
passed to the bankruptcy estate.2 9 The Code, however, provides
21. See 26 U.S.C. § 404(a) (1982).
22. If § 402 did not explicitly make pension plan contributions taxable in
the year of distribution, they would be taxable in the year in which the funds
were contributed under 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1982) as part of the employee's total
compensation.
23. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1984).
25. An assignment or alienation includes "[a]ny direct or indirect arrange-
ment . . . whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary a right
or interest enforceable against the plan in, or to, all or any part of a plan bene-
fit payment which is, or may become, payable to the participant or benefici-
ary." Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(i) (1984).
26. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 353 (1984)(effective for cases filed after Oct. 7, 1984).
28. Law of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (repealed 1978)).
29. Section 110(a)(5) under the old Act provided that:
1118 [Vol. 69:1113
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that all interests of the debtor, except for those falling within
certain narrow exclusions, pass into the bankruptcy estate.so
After the property has passed to the trustee in bankruptcy,
however, the property still may be exempted under either the
state or federal exemption systems.3 ' By expanding the concept
of the bankruptcy estate to include exemptable property, Con-
gress hoped to increase the amount of assets available to credi-
tors and to promote efficient administration in bankruptcy3
s
Faced with the question whether a debtor's interest in a
pension plan constituted nonexempt property includible in the
bankruptcy estate under the old Act, courts considered the na-
ture of the debtor's interest in the plan,3 the source of the
plan's funds,3 4 and the effect of state law on the planm Under
the Code, however, pension plans are included in the bank-
ruptcy estate unless excluded by section 541(c)(2), which pre-
vents the passing of a beneficial interest in such a trust when
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt . shall ... be vested
by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the
filing of the petition ... to . ..property, including rights in action,
which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have
transferred or which might have been levied upon or sold under judi-
cial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or
sequestered ....
11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (repealed 1978).
30. Section 541(a) of the new Code provides that "[e]xcept as provided in
subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case" are included in the
bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(emphasis added). Section 541(c)(2) ex-
cludes beneficial interests that are protected by transfer restrictions under ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law. Section 541(b)(1) excludes "any power that the
debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor."
11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1).
31. See supra notes 11-12 and infra notes 91-95.
32. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5791.
33. Under the old Act, courts held that a bankrupt's interest in a pension
plan could not be included in the bankruptcy estate unless it was fully vested.
See In re Goodwin, 57 F.2d 31, 32 (6th Cir. 1932); In re Howe, 381 F. Supp. 1025,
1026 (N.D. Fla. 1974); see also In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024, 1025 (5th Cir.
1975), rehg denied, 509 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1975)(vested interests in retirement
pensions are property rights).
34. See Goodwin, 57 F.2d at 32 (bankrupts pension funded from public
monies constituted a 'mere gratuity" that would not pass to the trustee in
bankruptcy). But cf. In re Short, 507 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1974) (funds attrib-
utable to debtor's contributions to retirement plan were required to be in-
eluded in the bankruptcy estate).
35. Because state law affects the transferability and leviability of prop-
erty, state law was decisive in determining whether the property was trans-
ferred to the trustee in bankruptcy by § 10(a)(5) of the old Bankruptcy Act.
See Annot., 34 A.L.R. FED. 316, 319-20 (1977); supra note 29.
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the trust is subject to transfer restrictions "enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law."'36
Courts have divided with respect to the proper meaning of
the crucial phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in section
541(c)(2). Although ERISA specifically preempts state law,3 7 it
also provides that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be con-
strued to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law of the United States."38 Thus, the Code will control to
the extent that it conflicts with ERISA. In In re Graham,39 the
Eighth Circuit found that these provisions precluded creditors
from reaching the debtor's interest in a qualified ERISA plan
under state law governing enforcement of judgments. The
court concluded, however, that the interest was includible in
the federal bankruptcy estate.40 Although it acknowledged that
ERISA preempted state law affecting pension plans, the Gra-
ham court held that only ERISA plans meeting the require-
ments of state law governing spendthrift trusts were excludible
from the bankruptcy estate.41 The effect of this holding is indi-
rectly to permit state law to govern ERISA pension plans.
Other courts have declined to rely on state spendthrift
trust law in determining the excludibility of a debtor's interest
in an ERISA plan. In In re Threewitt,42 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Kansas held that the anti-aliena-
tion provisions of an ERISA plan enforceable against general
creditors are likewise enforceable against the bankruptcy
trustee, and thus the "plain and simple language" of section
541(c)(2) requires exclusion of the debtor's interest in the plan
from the bankruptcy estate.43 The court concluded that limit-
ing the section 541(c)(2) exclusion to spendthrift trusts recog-
36. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2); see supra note 5.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see supra note 15.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d).
39. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
40. I& at 1273.
41. Id at 1271; see infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. But cf In re
Holt, 32 Bankr. 767 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (preemption provisions of ERISA
make it unnecessary to evaluate the plan under state law when considering in-
clusion in the estate; debtor's interest in employer-created ERISA plan ex-
cluded from the bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2)).
42. 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982).
43. Id. at 929. Courts have held that debtor interests in qualified ERISA
plans are beyond the reach of general creditors in nonbankruptcy proceedings.
See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 1980) (bene-
fits under a pension plan covered by ERISA were not subject to garnishment
by a beneficiary's creditors); Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 516 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (ERISA's anti-alienation and anti-
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nized by state law was an "unnecessarily narrow construction"
of that section.4 The Threewitt court reasoned that if Congress
had intended section 541(c)(2) to exclude only spendthrift
trusts, the statute would have specified the phrase "spendthrift
trust" rather than "applicable nonbankruptcy law."43
In In re Phillips,4 6 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Ohio found that both the language and the policy of
ERISA require the exclusion of the debtor's interest in an ER-
ISA plan under section 541(c)(2).47 The court held that section
541(c)(2) on its face is not limited to spendthrift trusts. Courts,
therefore, need not resort to extrapolation from the Code's leg-
islative history to determine the excludibility of ERISA plans.48
assignment provisions create a general federal exemption of pension benefits
from claims of commercial creditors).
44. Threewit4 24 Bankr. at 929.
45. Id. Evaluating the legislative history relied on by the Graham court,
the Threewitt court observed:
Since Congress did not choose to use the term "spendthrift trust"
in the language of the section itself, there is no reason to suppose that
when the term appears in the legislative history it should be taken as
a term of art; it is more reasonable to suppose that the term should be
given its ordinary, more general meaningas "inclusive of all trusts
which bar creditors from reaching a beneficiary's interest...
ICE
The Threewitt court noted that Congress was perfectly capable of writing
a narrow exclusion when it so intended. Id. at 930; cf. Southeastern Commu-
nity College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979) ("Congress understood accommo-
dation of the needs of handicapped individuals may require affirmative action
and knew how to provide for it in those instances where it wished to do so.");
Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 328 (3rd Cir. 1984) ('hen Congress
wished to exempt a class of instruments from some or all of the Acts' [The
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] provisions, it
had little trouble in doing so expressly."), cerL granted sub nom. Gould v.
Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 428 (1984).
46. 34 Bankr. 543 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
47. Specifically, the Phillips court found that Congress had enacted ER-
ISA to provide "uniformity of the law, including minimum standards" to pro-
mote the national interest involved in protecting the security of millions of
employees and their dependents and that this uniformity would be destroyed
if the excludibility of a debtor's interest in the plan depended on state law. Id.
at 545. The Graham court recognized that under its construction uniformity
would be sacrificed. See Graham, 726 F.2d at 127L The Graham court ob-
served that "[tihere is a conflict of authority among the states on the question
of the validity of such [spendthrift] trusts and on the extent to which a benefi-
ciary's right to future income and principal can be protected." Id. This con-
flict among the states, when combined with the Graham court's conclusion
that the operation of the section 541(c)(2) exclusion depends on state spend-
thrift trust law, destroys both the uniformity and minimum standards that
Congress intended ERISA to provide. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying
text
48. Phillips, 34 Bankr. at 545 (citing In re Pruitt, 30 Bankr. 303, 331
1985] 1121
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Since ERISA plan anti-alienation clauses are enforceable
against general creditors,49 the court concluded that they are
enforceable under nonbankruptcy law.50 Thus, the court held,
section 541(c)(2) excludes a debtor's interest in a qualified ER-
ISA plan from the bankruptcy estate.51
The Threewitt and Phillips courts properly relied on the
plain language of section 541(c)(2) in excluding the debtors' in-
terests in qualified ERISA plans from the bankruptcy estate.
General principles of statutory interpretation require that
courts adhere to the plain meaning of statutory language with-
out resort to legislative history or other secondary sources if
the meaning of the statute is clear.52 Section 541(c)(2) provides
that trusts containing restrictions on alienation or assignment
that are enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
may be excluded. This language of itself provides no basis for
assuming that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" does not include
ERISA. To interpret "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to mean
only "applicable state nonbankruptcy law," as the courts in
Graham and Lichstrahl implicitly do, is to ignore the plain
meaning of section 541(c)(2). If "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" is interpreted to include ERISA, no unintended conflict
arises between the Code and ERISA.53 Thus, properly inter-
preted, section 541(c)(2) represents an attempt to harmonize
the provisions of the Code and ERISA.
Even if a court should find that section 541(c)(2) is not
clear and unambiguous on its face and that resort to secondary
sources therefore is appropriate to aid its interpretation, the
legislative history of section 541(c)(2) does not support the in-
clusion of qualified employer-created ERISA plans in the bank-
ruptcy estate. In Graham, the court concluded that the section
541(c)(2) exclusion was designed to "preserve the status tradi-
tional spendthrift trusts had under the old Act." Although
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983)); see also In re Holt, 32 Bankr. 767, 771 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1983); In Re Rogers, 24 Bankr. 181, 183 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1983).
49. See supra note 43.
50. Phillips, 34 Bankr. at 544.
51. Id.
52. The Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen confronted with a statute
which is plain on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative history as a
guide to its meaning." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184
n.29 (1978). See generally 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION 46.01 (3d rev. ed. 1973).
53. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
54. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272. The court relied on S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 83, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 5787, 5869
1122 [Vol. 69:1113
BANKRUPTCY CODE
section 541(c)(2) clearly excludes such trusts, the legislative his-
tory does not limit the exclusion to only state law spendthrift
trusts.ss The legislative history provides no indication that the
reference to state law spendthrift trusts was intended to be ex-
haustive. It therefore does not support the Graham court's con-
clusion that only those ERISA trusts that can be characterized
as state law spendthrift trusts fall within the exclusion of sec-
tion 541(c)(2).
The Graham court also reasoned that the existence of a
federal exemption specifically applicable to pension benefits,
Bankruptcy Code section 522(d)(10)(E),ss evidenced a congres-
sional intent to include ERISA plans in the bankruptcy es-
tate.57 The court found that this federal pension exemption
and similar state exemptions comprise a "coherent scheme re-
garding a debtor's pension rights under the Code consistent
with the Code's general policy"58 that would be upset by ex-
cluding ERISA plans under section 541(c)(2). The court con-
cluded that because Congress included a specific exemption
dealing with pension benefits, such pension benefits are a mat-
ter of exemption, not exclusion.
A fair reading of section 522(d)(10)(E) does not support the
Graham court's conclusion. That exemption is broad enough to
cover plans that are not ERISA-qualified as well as those that
are qualified.5 9 Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that
and H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 369, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6325. The House report states:
Subsection (c) [of Section 541] invalidates restrictions on the
transfer of property of the debtor, in order that all of the interests of
the debtor in property will become property of the estate .... Para-
graph (2) of subsection (c), however, preserves restrictions on the
transfer of a spendthrift trust to the extent that the restriction is en-
forceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
H.Rl REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 369, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6325.
55. See Kladder, Employee Benefit Assets Under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act and ER.ISM 10 J. PENSION PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE 85, 91 (1984).
In Lichstrah 750 F.2d at 1488, the court stated that "[b]oth [the] House
and [the] Senate reports expressly limit section 541(c)(2) to spendthrift trusts."
Id. at 1490 n.3 (emphasis added). A close reading of the legislative history
cited by the court, however, does not reveal any such express limitation. See
HR. REP. No. 395, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 176, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5787, 5963, 6136; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5869.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). The text of section 522(d) is set out supra
note 11.
57. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272.
58. Id-
59. See supra note 11. The Graham court conceded that "the § 522(d)
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Congress did not intend qualified ERISA plans to be treated
differently than other pension plans. Indeed, the more
favorable tax treatment given to qualified ERISA plans under
section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code6° suggests that Con-
gress did in fact intend to treat ERISA plans differently than
other pension plans. Thus, although the inclusion of a statu-
tory provision exempting pension plans generally may suggest
that Congress intended to include a debtor's pension plan inter-
est in the estate, section 522(d)(10)(E) does not necessarily re-
quire that a debtor's interest in a qualified ERISA plan be
included in the bankruptcy estate.
Both the Fifth Circuit in Matter of Goff61 and the Eleventh
Circuit in In re Lichstrah6 2 held that all qualified ERISA pen-
sion plans are included in the bankruptcy estate unless the plan
conforms to the technical requirements of the state spendthrift
trust law.63 Spendthrift trusts, however, generally must con-
tain valid restraints on the transfer of the beneficiary's inter-
est.6 4 By definition, qualified ERISA plans satisfy this
requirement.65 In Lichstrahl, however, the court pierced the
debtor's corporate veil to hold that the settlor-debtor's reserva-
tion of a power to amend or terminate the trust through his
corporation gave him "absolute dominion" over the trust prop-
erty. The trust, therefore, could not be a spendthrift trust
under Florida law.6 6
In Goff, the trust at issue was a self-settled Keogh plan.67
The court concluded that such a plan could not be a spendthrift
trust because Texas law did not permit the settlor to be a bene-
(10)(E) exemption would apply to non-ERISA plans," but it concluded that
qualified ERISA plans were within its scope as well. Graham, 726 F.2d at
1272.
60. 26 U.S.C. § 501 (1982); see supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
61. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
62. 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985).
63. Lichstrah, 750 F.2d at 1490; Goff, 706 F.2d at 587; see also Graham, 24
Bankr. at 310.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152 (1959) defines a spendthrift
trust as a trust in "which by the terms of the trust or by statute a valid re-
straint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the interest of the benefi-
ciary is imposed."
65. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
66. Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d at 1490. Significantly, the court did not decide
whether the trust qualified for special tax treatment under 26 U.S.C. § 401. Id.
at 1490 n.4. See infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
67. A Keogh plan is a pension plan for self-employed wage-earners. See
26 U.S.C. § 401(c).
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ficiary of a spendthrift trust.6s This restriction is imposed to
"prevent any person from placing his property in what amounts
to a revocable trust for his own benefit which would be exempt
from the claims of his creditors."6 9
A close reading of Goff and Lichstrahl suggests that even if
state spendthrift trust law is to be determinative, a debtor's in-
terest in a qualified employer-created ERISA plan usually
should be excluded under 541(c)(2). In both Goff and Lich-
strahl, the interests were included because the plans were not
spendthrift trusts under state law. In general, however, quali-
fied employer-created ERISA plans will comply with state law
spendthrift trust requirements; the employer is the settlor, the
employees are the beneficiaries, and the assignment and aliena-
tion restrictions satisfy the required restraints on transfer.70 In
Graham, in which the court determined that section 541(c)(2)
excludes only those plans that qualify as spendthrift trusts
under state law, the court did not cite any provisions of the
plan that violated Iowa spendthrift trust law.71 Instead, it sim-
ply relied on Goff, which involved a self-settled Keogh plan
rather than an employer-created ERISA plan.72
Even though most ERISA plans would qualify as state
spendthrift trusts, reliance on state spendthrift trust law to de-
termine the excludibility of a debtor's interest creates several
problems. Although spendthrift trusts are not reachable by
general creditors, in some states spendthrift trust assets may be
68. Goff, 706 F.2d at 586-88. The prohibition against settlors being benefi-
ciaries of their spendthrift trusts is well established. See RESTATEbmNT (SEc-
OND) TRUSTS § 156 (1959); see also IND. CODE ANN. 304,3-2(b) (Burns Supp.
1984)("If the settlor is also a beneficiary of the trust, a provision restraining
the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his beneficial interest will not prevent
his creditors from satisfying claims from his interest in the trust estate."); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.180(7) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984) ("If a person creates
for his own benefit a trust with a provision restraining the voluntary or invol-
untary alienation of his interest, his interest nevertheless shall be subject to
alienation by operation of law or legal process.").
69. Goff, 706 F.2d at 588 (quoting In re Witlin, 640 F.2d 661, 662 (5th Cir.
1981)).
70. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
71. The bankruptcy court in Graham concluded that the ERISA plan vio-
lated Iowa state spendthrift trust law because Graham was both the settlor
and beneficiary. Graham, 24 Bankr. at 310. The court recognized that "in
form, the settlor is the corporation" (Charles W. Graham, M.D., Ltd.), but con-
cluded that because "Graham's earnings from his medical practice furnished
the corpus of the trust... [Graham was] therefore both the settlor and bene-
ficiary of the Fund." Id The appellate court, however, did not note any spe-
cific violations of Iowa law.
72. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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reached by certain classes of creditors.73 Common exceptions
include creditors' claims for alimony,7 4 for payment for neces-
sary services, 75 and for federal and state taxes.76 The provisions
vary from state to state. Moreover, some states completely pro-
scribe spendthrift trusts.77 Under the Goff and Lichstrahl anal-
ysis, these variations result in different treatment of debtors'
ERISA plan interests in different states. For example, if a
debtor lived in a state in which spendthrift trusts are not per-
mitted, the debtor's interest in the pension plan would become
part of the bankruptcy estate. On the other hand, another
debtor residing in a state that permits spendthrift trusts may be
able to exclude the interest in the plan from the estate. ER-
ISA, however, was intended to provide uniformity for pension
plans by preempting state laws affecting them.78 Reliance on
state trust law to determine the scope of the 541(c)(2) exclusion
would result in different treatment of ERISA plans in different
states and thus destroy this intended uniformity.
Transfer of the debtor's interest in a qualified plan to the
trustee in bankruptcy also would disqualify the plan under ER-
ISA. A transfer gives the trustee a "right or interest enforcea-
73. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) TRusTs § 157 (1959); see, e.g., Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 381.180(6) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984) ("Although a trust is a
spendthrift trust, the interest of the beneficiary shall be subject to the satisfac-
tion of an enforceable claim against the beneficiary: (a) by the spouse or child
of the beneficiary for support, or by the spouse for maintenance; (b) for neces-
sary services rendered to the beneficiary or necessary supplies furnished to
him; and (c) by the United States or the Commonwealth of Kentucky for
taxes due from him on account of his interest in the trust or the income
therefrom.").
74. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.080 (Vernons Supp. 1984); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.25 (West 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 136 (Purdon
1965).
75. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2005 (WEsT 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 60, § 175.25 (West 1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.96.150 (Supp. 1984).
76. See 4 G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 224 (rev. 2d ed. 1979)("The use of spendthrift provisions in a trust cannot re-
lieve the beneficiary from obligations to the United States or a state so as to
insulate his interest against a claim based on income or death taxes or similar
liabilities.").
77. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-115 (Supp. 1981). This statute provides
that "all estates or interests of trust beneficiaries are alienable either volunta-
rily or involuntarily to the same extent as are legal estates or interests of a
similar nature." Id. The only exceptions to this general rule are discretionary,
support, and protective trusts. Under this statute, no ERISA-qualified plan
could be excluded from the bankruptcy estate as a spendthrift trust. Id.; cf.
Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Budlong, 106 R.I. 780, 786-88, 264 A.2d 18, 21-22 (1970)
(under the minority position of Rhode Island law, all spendthrift provisions
are invalid).
78. See supra note 15.
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ble against the plan," which constitutes an assignment or
alienation under the Internal Revenue Code.79 Since benefits
under a plan may not be alienated or assigned if the plan is to
remain qualified, the transfer to the trustee in bankruptcy
would disqualify the plan.80 Those courts that have limited the
section 541(c)(2) exclusion to ERISA plans satisfying the re-
quirements of state spendthrift trust law have overlooked this
important potential consequence."' Furthermore, a narrow
construction of section 541(c)(2) endangers not only the
debtor's retirement funds but also those of the debtor's co-em-
ployees, since disqualification of the plan for one member dis-
qualifies that plan for all other participants as well.
Moreover, the requirement that the plan not be "subject
to" any process suggests that a plan in which the benefits could
be reached by the trustee in bankruptcy would be disqualified
at inception.8 2 Therefore, in those states that do not recognize
spendthrift trusts or impose technical requirements not
satisifed by a particular plan, ERISA-qualified plans would be
unavailable.8a Once a plan is found to be not qualified, all of
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (1984); see supra note 25.
80. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1982); see also supra notes 23-25 and accompa-
nying text. This conclusion is supported by an Internal Revenue Service pri-
vate letter ruling concluding that honoring a pension deduction order of a
bankruptcy court would disqualify the plan:
Neither the regulations under Code section 401(a)(13), nor the
legislative history of this section provide any exception to the anti-
alienation requirements for an attachment arising from a bankruptcy
proceeding. In this case, the above-described order of the United
States Bankruptcy court, if honored, would benefit the general credi-
tors of the plan participant in question and thus, would result in a
prohibited attachment.
Therefore, we conclude that the honoring by Company M of the
pension deduction order of the United States Bankruptcy Court will
violate section 401(a)(13) of the Code and will result in the disqualifi-
cation of Plan X.
IRS Letter Rulings Reports (CCH) 8,131,020 (May 5, 1981). It should be noted
that private letter rulings may not be cited as precedent 26 U.S.C. § 6110(j)(3)
(1982).
8L See Lichstrah 750 F.2d at 1490; Goff, 706 F.2d at 587.
82. BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY 1278 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) defines "subject to"
as "JIjiable, subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to; governed or af-
fected by;, provided that; provided; answerable for." (emphasis added). If the
possibility exists that a bankruptcy trustee could reach an employee-debtor's
interest in an ERISA plan, the plan would be "subject to" legal or equitable
process at the inception of the plan, even if no petition in bankruptcy had been
filed at that time.
83. In states such as North Carolina, which proscribe the validity of anti-
alienation and anti-assignment provisions in trust instruments, the provisions
required by 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) and 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) would not be enforce-
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the funds lose their tax-exempt status and all plan participants
incur immediate tax liability.84 In Graham only two partici-
pants were involved, and in Lichstrahl only one participant was
affected, but in larger plans many unsuspecting participants
would be forced to recognize income immediately because of
the disqualification. 5 This result conflicts with ERISA's policy
of encouraging deferral of compensation for use in retirement
years and would render ERISA plans less attractive to both
employees and employers.8 6 Reliance on state spendthrift trust
law to interpret section 541(c)(2) thus is inappropriate.
Cases limiting the section 541(c)(2) exclusion to state law
spendthrift trusts usually have involved self-settled plans,
whereas cases in which courts read section 541(c)(2) more
broadly to exclude the debtor's interest from the bankruptcy
estate often have involved employer-created ERISA plans.87
Those courts that deny exclusion of ERISA plans from the
bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2) may be moved by an
often unarticulated concern that a contrary interpretation
would encourage fraudulent exclusions.8 8 Such a concern is not
groundless, yet possibilities of fraud would be better handled on
a case-by-case basis rather than by a general interpretation in-
ble under state trust law. See supra note 77. If the § 541(c)(2) exclusion is
held to depend on state trust law, all ERISA plans would be included in the
bankruptcy estate in states such as North Carolina. Similarly, if a plan cov-
ered any employees who were residents of North Carolina the plan would be
disqualified from inception because it would always be subject to claims by
bankruptcy trustees.
84. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
85. See id-
86. Employers that have employees in many states would encounter sub-
stantial difficulty in qualifying pension plans under ERISA. The employer's
problems would be compounded by having to requalify the plans every time a
plan participant petitions for relief in bankruptcy.
87. Cases involving employer-created plans include: In re Phillips, 34
Bankr. 543 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Holt, 32 Bankr. 767 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1983); In re Pruitt, 30 Bankr. 303 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); and In re
Threewitt, 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982). In re Johnson, 724 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir.
1984), involved a self-settled annuity, and In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.
1982), involved a self-settled Keogh plan. Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d at 1488, and
Graham, 726 F.2d at 1268, both involved employer-created trusts that the
courts treated as self-settled. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
88. See Johnson, 724 F.2d at 1141 (commenting that it is "unjust to allow
any person to voluntarily place property in a revocable trust for his own bene-
fit and claim it as exempt from the claims of his creditors"). But see Goff, 706
F.2d at 588 ("Debtors could shelter funds in Keogh plans immediately before
declaring bankruptcy ... and immediately after discharge of all debts with-
draw such funds for their own benefit.").
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cluding many ERISA plans in the bankruptcy estate 8 9
Although it may be appropriate to deny exclusion for self-set-
tled trusts generally,90 to deny the section 541(c)(2) exclusion
to employee interests in all employer-created ERISA plans
would be contrary to both the language of the Code and the
policy of ERISA. Failure to afford protection to debtors' inter-
ests in qualified, employer-created ERISA plans in bankruptcy
defeats the legitimate expectation of the employee-debtor that
ERISA funds will be available as an income substitute for re-
tirement. In the long run, such a policy inevitably would dis-
courage participation in ERISA plans. To avoid this result, and
the consequent destruction of employee retirement protection,
courts should hold that in the absence of fraud in the particular
case, a debtor's interest in an employer-created ERISA plan is
excluded from the bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2).
I. EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 522
If a court determines that the debtor's interest in an ER-
ISA plan is not excluded from the bankruptcy estate, it must
determine whether the debtor's interest in the plan is ex-
empted from the claims of the debtor's creditors. Under sec-
tion 522 of the Code, the debtor may choose either the federal
or state exemptions.9 ' Debtors choosing the federal exemptions
may exempt an interest in a pension plan "to the extent rea-
sonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any depen-
dent of the debtor."92 Debtors choosing the state exemptions
may under section 522(b)(2)(A) put beyond the reach of credi-
tors any property exemptable under state law93 and also "any
property that is exempt under Federal law other than [section
522(d)]."- 4 The section 522(b)(2)(A) "other federal law" exemp-
tion reflects a congressional intent to ensure the availability of
certain exemptions in the event that the debtor's state has
89. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
90. See id.
91. As noted above, the debtor's choice is in fact determined by the state
of the debtor's domicile. See supra note 10.
92. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(E)(10). The text of § 522(d) is set out supra note 11
93. See generally 2 W. COLER, COLLmER's BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 522.07
(3d ed. 1982) (discussing types of exempt property).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (debtor may exempt "any property that is ex-
empt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or
local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place
in which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately
preceding the date of the filing").
1985] 1129
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
opted out of the federal exemption scheme.9 5
In both Graham and Lichstrahl, the debtor chose the state
exemptions.9 6 After determining that the plans were includible
in the debtors' bankruptcy estates, both courts held that the
debtors' pension plans were not exempted under section
522(b)(2)(A).9 7 Both debtors argued that their ERISA plan in-
terests were exempt under federal law, asserting that the anti-
assignment and anti-alienation provisions required by ERISA98
and the Internal Revenue Code99 barred garnishment of quali-
fied plans by the general creditors of the beneficiary.10 0 The
Graham court, noting that the list of federal statutes set out in
the legislative history illustrating the "other federal law" ex-
emptions did not include ERISA,10 1 concluded that the protec-
tion from garnishment did not constitute a federal exemption
of the type referred to in the Code.10 2
The list of "other federal law" exemptions contained in the
legislative history to section 522 was intended to be merely il-
lustrative and not exclusive. 10 3 Although the Graham court
perhaps placed too much emphasis on Congress's failure to in-
clude ERISA in its illustrative catalog, 104 the court's decision
95. See In re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233, 234 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (al-
though a state may have opted out, Congress intended that all debtors have
available § 522(b)(2) exemptions); cf. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
126, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6087 ("[The bill contin-
ues to recognize the States' interest in regulating credit within the States, but
enunciates a bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh start.").
96. Lichstrah 750 F.2d at 1490; Graham, 726 F.2d at 1273.
97. Lichstrahl 750 F.2d at 1492; Graham, 726 F.2d at 1274.
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) ("Each pension plan shall provide that bene-
fits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.").
99. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13); see also supra note 23 and accompanying
text.
100. See General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 462-63 (6th Cir. 1980);
Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 516
(N.D. Tex. 1981); see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
102. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1274.
103. The statutes listed are designated as "some of the items that may be
exempted under Federal laws." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5861; H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 5963,
6316 (emphasis added).
104. See Graham, 726 F.2d at 1274. Relying on Goff, the Graham court
concluded that ERISA was not within this exemption because it would have
been included in this list had Congress intended to exempt benefits under ER-
ISA. Id. The Goff court stated, "Congress did not 'overlook' ERISA. Given
the extensive and general reach of ERISA-qualified plans, it is highly improb-
able that Congress intended their inclusion without mention in the Section
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not to exempt the debtor's interest in an ERISA plan under
section 522(b)(2)(A) is sound. The listed statutes govern pen-
sions, wages, or benefits provided by the federal government or
by employers in industries that traditionally have been closely
regulated by the federal government.10 5 The private pension
system established under ERISA, however, is materially differ-
ent from those listed. The federal government has a special in-
terest in protecting the pensions it establishes for its employees
that is not present in private pension plans.106
Even if a court determines that private pension fund inter-
ests may properly be exempted,107 it still must address the
problem of tax disqualification. If the exemption is allowed,
the debtor will retain at least a part of the plan funds for re-
tirement, but the entire ERISA plan would be disqualified be-
cause of the transfer of the funds to the bankruptcy trustee108
Immediately upon transfer, the plan becomes disqualified and
the debtor and all other plan participants automatically must
recognize the funds as gross income.1°9 The exemption provi-
sions cannot cure this result."0
IV. EXCEPTIONS
The language of the Bankruptcy Code, as well the policy
underlying the Code and ERISA, strongly supports the exclu-
sion of a debtor's interest in employer-created ERISA plans
from the bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2). As some
courts have recognized,"' however, exclusion maybe inappro-
522(b)(2)(A) exemption in the midst of a listing of significantly less compre-
hensive and less well known statutes." Goff, 706 F.2d at 585.
105. The Graham court observed that the listed statutes are limited in
their application and govern payments that are "all peculiarly federal in na-
ture." Graham, 726 F.2d at 1274.
106. The Goff court observed that the "'property covered by ERISA dif-
fers in nature from that covered under the (statutes listed in the legislative
history]." Goff, 706 F.2d at 585-86. ERISA "sweepingly regulated" private
pensions and welfare benefits, and the listed statutes dealt with pensions and
welfare benefits that were publicly funded or created. I& at 586; see also
supra note 34 (public pensions were exempt under the Act because they were
a "mere gratuity").
107. See In re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233, 235 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
108. See supra notes 18-22.
109. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
110. If courts continue to interpret the § 541(c)(2) exclusion to apply only
to state law spendthrift trusts, 11 U.S.C. § 401(a)(2) should be amended so that
this type of transfer would not be a violation of the anti-alienation restrictions.
See supra note 80.
11. See In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 589 (5th Cir. 1982) (employer-created and
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priate for self-settled plans.1" Although employer-created ER-
ISA plans must contain restraints on assignment and alienation
corresponding to the restrictions on transfer generally required
for spendthrift trusts,1 13 most self-settled plans do not contain
such restrictions. The required restrictions in employer-created
plans serve to alleviate the risk that a debtor may attempt to
use a pension fund as a means of defrauding creditors. In the
absence of such restrictions, a debtor may attempt to use a self-
settled plan to avoid the lawful claims of creditors. For exam-
ple, the debtor could create a pension trust, transfer nonex-
empt property to the trust, and then, after discharge in
bankruptcy, remove the assets from the trust." 4 Courts must
beware of such schemes and determine on the facts of each case
whether the debtor's conduct was designed to defraud creditors.
If, for example, the debtor retains control of the trust funds, as
in Goff,115 or if the debtor transfers funds to the trust on the
eve of bankruptcy, the court should not hesitate to include the
debtor's interest in the plan in the bankruptcy estate. Because
disqualification of the self-settled plan would not bring about
adverse tax consequences to others, the court should include
the plan interest in the bankruptcy estate and deal with the
debtor's interest as a matter of exemption under section 522.
A similar problem arises if the employer is a corporation of
which the pension plan beneficiary is the controlling share-
holder. Again, because the debtor has indirect control over the
funds, the debtor may attempt to assert control for the purpose
of defrauding creditors. In In re Klayer,"6 for example, the
debtor failed to observe corporate formalities and did not segre-
gate the trust assets from his own." 7 Rather than properly
-controlled plans would be analogous to spendthrift trusts and would merit
treatment different from the self-created and self-controlled Keogh plan).
112. Both Keogh plans and IRAs are self-settled pension plans. The settlor
can determine the ways in which these funds are invested and, if willing to
pay taxes and penalties, can terminate the plan or withdraw the funds. Keogh
plans are subject to anti-alienation provisions, but other types of self-settled
retirement plans are not. See Kladder, supra note 55, at 86-88; see also Wein-
traub & Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 264 (1984) (dis-
cussing Keogh plans and IRAs as property of the bankruptcy estate).
113. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
114. See Goff, 706 F.2d at 588.
115. I& at 589.
116. 20 Bankr. 270 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981). In Kayer, the pension plan
was terminated in 1970, four years before ERISA was enacted. The court
therefore was not required to address the question of whether an employer-
created ERISA plan was includible in the bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2).
117. Id. at 274 ("[Ihe debtor has made such personal use of the trust assets
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holding trust assets, Klayer used them to purchase a home for
his own use.n 8 Similarly, in In re Watson,'" the debtor con-
tributed virtually all the funds in the plan and retained the
power to withdraw those funds and terminate the trust at will.
In both of these cases, the courts properly included the trust as-
sets in the bankruptcy estate, holding in effect that each trust
had become a self-settled trust.
In re Graham presents the more difficult situation in
which the beneficiary is the sole shareholder of a corporation
whose corporate identity has not been disregarded. Although
Dr. Graham, the debtor, did not settle the trust, his corpora-
tion, Charles W. Graham M.D., Ltd., did. As director of the
corporation, however, Graham determined the amount contrib-
uted to the plan. Dr. Graham did not exercise any control over
the trust assets except in his capacities as director of the corpo-
ration, trustee of the plan, and member of the plan's advisory
committee. Consequently, because his only powers over the
plan were fiduciary in nature, the plan was analogous to a
spendthrift trust.
Dr. Graham was involved in the administration of the
trust, but because he was not acting in his individual capacity,
the court's discussion of the self-settled nature of the trust is
not dispositive.120 The Eighth Circuit held that the section
541(c)(2) exclusion was limited to spendthrift trusts recognized
by state law.-' If the court had not ignored the corporate
form, however, the plan may have qualified as a spendthrift
trust. If the court was ignoring the corporate entity on the
grounds that the corporation was the alter ego of Dr. Graham,
it should have done so explicitly. Courts have long recognized
the separate corporate existence of single shareholder corpora-
tions, and there is no reason to refuse to do so in bankruptcy if
and has engaged in self-dealing to such a degree as to cause a merger of the
legal and equitable interests in the trust.").
118. 1& at 271.
119. 13 Bankr. 391 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981). In this case, although the plan
was ERISA-qualified, all of the plan contributions were made by the debtor,
and he could withdraw them at any time.
120. Although Iowa follows the general rule that one cannot be both the
settlor and the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, see Harrison v. City Nat'l
Bank, 210 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D. Iowa 1962); DeRousse v. Williams, 181 Iowa
379, 382, 164 N.W. 896, 897 (1917), in Graham two distinct legal entities occu-
pied these positions: the corporation was the settlor and Dr. Graham was the
beneficary.
121. The only problem cited by the court was the plan's self-settled nature.




the corporate form is not abused. If, on the other hand, the
court believed that the corporate form was being abused, there
is a well-developed body of law allowing the court to "pierce
the corporate veil. ' 122 Thus, the Graham court could have
reached the same result without construing section 541(c)(2)
narrowly to exclude only state law spendthrift trusts. Upon
finding either an abuse of the corporate entity or an attempted
fraud on creditors, courts should include the debtor's interest in
the bankruptcy estate. Sole shareholders, however, should not
be penalized merely for choosing the corporate form.
CONCLUSION
A debtor's interest in a qualified employer-created ERISA
plan usually should be excluded from the bankruptcy estate
under section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. This exclusion
would effectuate ERISA's policy of preserving pension funds
for use in retirement and also would avoid the inequities cre-
ated by limiting the exclusion to plans that satisfy variant state
spendthrift trust law. The concern that debtors may use pen-
sion plans as a means of defrauding creditors, which seems to
be the basis for decisions including ERISA funds in the bank-
ruptcy estate, is better dealt with on a case-by-case basis rather
than by a blanket rule mandating inclusion. By excluding em-
ployer-created ERISA plans from the bankruptcy estate and
exempting debtor's interests in self-created plans, absent a find-
ing of fraud, courts can protect the rights of creditors while
preserving ERISA's goal of encouraging employees to save for
their retirement years.
Nancy Roetman Menzel
122. See F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONs: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.10 (2d
ed. 1971).
In Lichstrahl, the court apparently recognized that it was ignoring the cor-
porate entity:
While appellant as beneficiary cannot assign or alienate his interest in
the trusts, he as sole officer and director of the settlor P.A. can amend
or terminate the trusts. That appellant can only amend or terminate
the pension plans in his capacity as agent for the P.A. is not important
here. He alone enjoys the authority to act, whether as an agent of the
settlor or in his own right as trustee and beneficiary. He therefore
enjoys "absolute dominion" over the property of the trusts. The rea-
sons for creating and enforcing spendthrift trusts would not be served
if we were unwilling to look beyond legal forms in this case.
Lichstrah, 750 F.2d at 1490.
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